

Virgil Security's PHE Service Technical Paper

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What is PHE

Password-Hardened Encryption (“PHE”) is a two-party protocol that brings password-based security to a new level in three ways:

1. Replaces password hashing in a way making it impossible to run offline and online attacks.
2. Adds unique data encryption key to every user record. This key can be revealed only after providing a correct password.
3. Makes stealing user records useless by performing key rotation procedure.

Virgil Security, Inc. gives developers a security toolbox to protect their application data using end-to-end encryption and password security, and has built a service around the PHE protocol.

Authors of the PHE protocol: Russell W. F. Lai, Christoph Egger, Manuel Reinert, Sherman S. M. Chow, Matteo Maffei and Dominique Schroder.

Advantages of PHE

1. User password is never transmitted to the PHE service in any form.
2. Offline attacks are not possible. You cannot tell if a password was entered correctly before PHE service replies.
3. Scheduled or on-demand key rotation is a part of the protocol. This key rotation renders previous user enrollment records useless.
4. Compared to pairing-based protocols like Pythia, it is ~10 times faster with thousands of requests per core. Also, there is no need for third party crypto libraries, as standard NIST p-256 elliptic curve does the job.
5. For each user your backend stores a number $T = A + B$, where A is a number representing user’s password and B is a pseudorandom number received from PHE service. So the only way to check if the password is valid is to try to reconstruct B and send it back to the service so that it could verify it and prove you that it was done correctly.
6. PHE service proves each step with Zero Knowledge Proof and the backend validates all responses using the server’s public key. So there’s no way PHE server can compromise the backend with its answers.
7. User enrollment records are additionally protected by the salt and backend private key to which PHE service has no access.

Prerequisites overview

App Backend – application server that provides registration and authentication operations, stores users passwords and personally identifiable information (PII).

- **App Backend** performs cryptographic operations and communicates with PHE Service using a special SDK.
- **App Backend** owns the **Private Key (X)** that is generated by the developer using CLI on a local machine or on Virgil Security's Dashboard.
- **App Backend** gets a **Public Key** of the PHE service.

PHE Service – a standalone service in Virgil Infrastructure dedicated to implementing the password-hardened encryption protocol.

- **PHE Service** generates a keypair. The **Private Key (Y)** is stored on the PHE Service and the **Public Key** is sent to the App Backend.


Cryptography inside:

Elliptic curve	NIST P-256
Hash	SHA-512
Hashing to the elliptic curve point	Shallue-Woestijne-Ulas algorithm
KDF	HKDF
PII Data Encryption	AES-256-GCM
Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP)	Generalized Schnorr protocol

Record – a unique data that is associated with a specific user’s password (1 password = 1 record).

Sign Up (Enrollment)

Creates an Enrollment Record for *each* user’s password on PHE.



←

sNonce, CO, C1, Proof

CO, C1 – points

$CO = y \cdot (sNonce, "0")$

$C1 = y \cdot (sNonce, "1")$

$HCO = x \cdot (cNonce, password, "0")$

$HC1 = x \cdot (cNonce, password, "1")$

M – random, $MC = x \cdot M$

$TO = CO + HCO$

$T1 = C1 + HC1 + MC$

DATABASE:
 TO, T1, sNonce, cNonce

Phase #1. The App Backend asks PHE Server for an Enrollment

App Backend:

1. Sends [empty request](#) to server Enroll endpoint.

PHE Server:

1. Generates [32-byte random salt](#).
2. Hashes salt with two different domains into two curve points [HS0](#) and [HS1](#).
3. Performs scalar multiplication of [HS0](#) and [HS1](#) by its [Private Key \(Y\)](#) to get points [C0](#) and [C1](#).
4. Calculates Zero Knowledge Proof which proves that [C0](#) and [C1](#) were indeed calculated using server's [Private Key \(Y\)](#).
5. PHE Server replies with the following data:
 - a. [32-byte random salt](#)
 - b. Points [C0](#) and [C1](#)
 - c. [ZKP](#)

Phase #2. The App Backend generates an Enrollment Record

App Backend:

1. Receives [enrollment](#) from the PHE Server.
2. Verifies [ZKP](#) using server's [Public Key](#).
3. Generates [32-byte random salt](#).
4. Hashes a user's [password](#) using [salt](#) and two different domains into two elliptic curve points [HC0](#) and [HC1](#).
5. Generates random elliptic curve point [M](#).
6. Multiplies [HC0](#), [HC1](#) and [M](#) by the App Backend's [Private Key \(X\)](#) to get points [HC0`](#), [HC1`](#) and [M`](#).
7. Calculates enrollment points [T0](#) and [T1](#) in the following way:
 - a. $T0 = C0 + HC0`$
 - b. $T1 = C1 + HC1` + M`$
8. Saves enrollment [record](#) to the database. Enrollment record contains:
 - a. Server [32-byte random salt](#)
 - b. App Backend [32-byte random salt](#)
 - c. Points [T0](#) and [T1](#)

Phase #3. User's PII (data) encryption


App Backend:

1. The point [M](#) is serialized and then put through HKDF to receive the [Encryption Key \(K\)](#).

2. Encrypts a user's PII data by performing the following steps:
 - a. Generates [32-byte random Salt](#).
 - b. Performs [HKDF\(K, salt\)](#) to receive per-data [AES key](#) and [Nonce](#).
 - c. Encrypt data with [AES key](#) and [Nonce](#).
 - d. Save [ciphertext](#) concatenated with [Salt](#).

Login (Verify Record)

Verifies user's Record in the database at the login step.



Phase #1. App Backend extracts point C0 from T0

App Backend:

1. When a user tries to log in, they supply their [user ID](#) and [password](#). The [user ID](#) is used to retrieve Enrollment Record from the database.
2. Then App Backend performs the following steps:
 - a. Hashes user-provided [password](#) using [salt](#) from the Enrollment Record and the first domain into elliptic curve point [HCO](#).
 - b. Performs scalar multiplication of [HCO](#) by App Backend's [Private Key \(X\)](#) to obtain [HCO`](#).
 - c. Subtracts [HCO`](#) from [T0](#) to receive [C0](#).
 - d. Sends [Server Salt](#) and [C0](#) to the PHE Server.

Phase #2. PHE Server verifies C0

App Backend:

1. The PHE Server receives **Salt** and **C0**.
2. Hashes **Salt** with the first domain into curve point **HS0**.
3. Performs scalar multiplication of **HS0** by its **Private Key (Y)** to get the original point **C0**.
4. The server compares the calculated point **C0** and the received **C0**.
5. If the original point **C0** matches the received one, the PHE Server calculates point **C1** in the same way it did during the enrollment process and sends **C1** and **ZKP** back to the App Backend.
6. If the calculated **C0** at the PHE Server does not match the calculated **C0** at the App Backend then PHE Server calculates **ZKP** of incorrectness and sends it back to the App Backend.

Phase #3. App Backend completes password verification

App Backend:

When the App Backend receives the answer from the PHE Server it looks at the result, verifies the **ZKP** and then performs the following steps:

1. If the result is “verification failed” then abort the login process as the **password** was entered incorrectly.
2. If the result is “verification succeeded” then proceed with the login process and extract the **Encryption Key**:
 - a. Calculates $HC1'$ using **Client Salt**, in the same way, it did during the enrollment process.
 - b. Extracts point $M = (T1 - C1 - HC1') * 1/x$.
 - c. Master **Encryption Key (K) = HKDF (M)**.

Key Rotation (Update User's Record)

Key rotation allows the App Backend and the PHE Server to jointly create a new set of keys and seamlessly update user records. It is performed in the following phases:

Phase #1. App Backend asks for the Update Token

1. App Backend asks PHE Server to rotate Keys.
2. The PHE Server creates two 256 bit random numbers, **A** and **B**.
3. The Server calculates its new **Private Key (Y') = Y * A + B**.
4. PHE Server sends **A** and **B** to the App Backend. **A** and **B** are called the Update Token.

Phase #2. App Backend updates its keys

After the App Backend receives the Update Token, it is able to calculate new keys:

1. App Backend calculates its new **Private Key** (X') = $X * A$.
2. App Backend calculates new **Server Public Key** (PUB') = $(PUB * A) + (G * B)$ where G is P-256 base point.

Note that the PHE Server never sends its new Public Key to the App Backend. The App Backend is able to calculate it itself.

Phase #3. App Backend updates user records

After the App Backend receives the Update Token, it is able to calculate new values for the user enrollment records in the following way:

1. Retrieves the **old record** from the database.
2. Extracts $T0$ and $T1$ points.
3. Extracts Server's **Salt Ns**.
4. Calculates **HS0** and **HS1** points in the same way as during the Enrollment process.
5. $T0' = (T0 * A) + (HS0 * B)$.
6. $T1' = (T1 * A) + (HS1 * B)$.
7. Saves new $T0'$ and $T1'$ inside user enrollment record.

From now on, your backend is able to verify the same passwords and extract the same keys as before rotation but using the new set of keys you created with the help of Update Token.

Note: User password and Encryption key (M) remain the same after key rotation, so that the rotation process is seamless.

For more information please visit VirgilSecurity.com/purekit

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